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MAMLŪK LOYALTY: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE LATE SELJUQ PERIOD 
D. G. Tor, University of Notre Dame 
Abstract 1 
This article addresses one key aspect of the widespread institution of pre-Mongol era Islamic 
military slavery: the alleged superior loyalty of slave-soldiers (known as ghulāms or mamlūks), 
using the late Seljuq period (late 11th–late12th century) as a case study. The examination of the role 
of slave soldiers during this period reveals that, 1) the assumption of the superior loyalty of slave 
soldiery is a modern expectation, not one entertained by the slave-soldiers‟ contemporaries; 2) the 
slave soldiery exhibited the same type of self-interest and limited loyalty as did the free soldiery; 
and 3) the slave system also produced its own additional peculiar and inherent limitations on 
loyalty: first, a heightened degree of rivalry within the slave corps and obsessive vying for the 
ruler‟s favor that led frequently to jealousy and betrayal; and, second, the strictly personal nature 
of the ghulām‟s tie to his master, which meant that even the most loyal ghulām‟s allegiance ended 
with the said master‟s demise, after which the ghulām frequently became a threat to his erstwhile 
lord‟s heirs, since his sole remaining loyalties were to his slave-corps faction and his own personal 
interest. 
Introduction 
The central place occupied by the institution of military slavery in the Islamic 
world has long attracted the attention of researchers. The vast bulk of such 
research, however, has been directed toward the period after 1250, and has 
focused on the Mamlūk and Ottoman sultanates, in whose armies military slaves 
constituted not only the dominant component, but in many cases virtually the 
1  This research was funded by grants from the Israel Science Foundation (ISF) and the 
German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research (GIF). An early version of this paper was 
presented at the International Workshop in Memory of David Ayalon, The Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, in December 2008. The author is grateful to Reuven Amitai for the 
invitation to participate in that workshop. The author thanks Michael Cook and David 
Durand-Guedy for having read and commented upon this article. Finally, the author is 
deeply indebted to Patricia Crone for a truly exhaustive critique and numerous helpful 
suggestions and insights. 
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exclusive component of real military significance.2 Similarly, the origins of the 
institution, and its initial large-scale introduction into the ‘Abbāsid armies in the 
early ninth century, have benefited – albeit to a lesser degree – from scholarly 
investigation.3 But the study of the institution of military slavery as practiced 
among the Persianate dynasties which ruled the Islamic heartland in the inter-
vening four centuries, between the collapse of the ‘Abbāsids in the mid-ninth 
century and the rise of the Mamlūk sultanate in the thirteenth, has remained a 
virtual terra incognita.4 
This article is the second effort by the present author to address Islamic 
military slavery in that so-called “Middle Period,” the era of the autonomous 
Persianate dynasties in the Islamic heartland and the eastern lands. Whereas the 
previous article examined the widely-accepted thesis that military slaves con-
stituted the primary and preferred source of manpower during the pre-Seljuq 
Persianate dynastic period,5  the present study will examine both a different 
period and a different aspect of what one might call “The Mamlūk Mystique”: 
specifically, it will reconsider the alleged superior loyalty of the products of the 
military slave system, using primarily the Seljuqs of the post-Malikshāh period 
as a case study.  
The Seljuqs make a useful case study because they had, virtually from the 
inception of their rule, a mixed army, consisting primarily of free Turkmens and 
slave ghulāmān, but including also various auxiliary forces of Arab, Kurdish and 
2  See the corpus of David AYALON‟s articles on the subject, many of which have been 
collected into Variorum reprint volumes, such as AYALON 1988, and AYALON 1994; many 
other scholars, of course, have also espoused this approach, e.g. HUMPHREYS 1977; MENAGE 
1966, and so forth. This adoption of the late-medieval Mamluk Sultanate as the normative 
frame of reference is apparent even in the preferred scholarly terminology employed for 
military slaves: The word “mamlūk” virtually never appears in sources written before the 
thirteenth century; earlier works normally refer to military slaves as ghilmān or ghulāmān. 
3  E.g. CRONE, 1980; PIPES, 1981; KENNEDY, 2001; LA VAISSIÈRE, 2007. 
4  Until recently the only explorers of this unfamiliar terrain were Edmund BOSWORTH and 
Jürgen PAUL, who between them wrote about the Ṣaffārid, Sāmānid, Būyid and Ghaznavid 
armies. However, even their pioneering work treated army organization in general; it did not 
focus specifically on the slave institution: e.g. PAUL, 1996: 93–139; PAUL, 1994; BOS-
WORTH, 1968; BOSWORTH, 1965–1966; BOSWORTH, 1960. 
5  Showing that in the Ṣaffārid, Sāmānid, and Ghaznavid armies military slaves did not occupy 
the preponderant position that has frequently been attributed to them; TOR, 2008. For an 
exposition of the idea that study was refuting, see e.g. AYALON, 1975: 56, or AYALON, 1996: 
305, writing of the period from the rise of Islam to the eleventh century: “The Mamlūk 
socio-military institution, in its various forms, had been the mainstay of Islam‟s military 
might throughout the greatest part of its existence.” 
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Daylamite tribal levies, volunteer warriors, and others.6 The Seljuq officer corps 
was of similarly diverse constitution: it contained free amīrs of various ethnic 
backgrounds – people such as Atsız al-Turkmānī, the Arab Dubays b. Ṣadaqa, 
and the Daylamite Muḥammad b. Dushmanziyār – and slaves such as Ayāz, 
Buzghush, and Qumāch. The late Seljuq era is also a useful one to study because 
it included both a turbulent period – the incessant civil wars and jockeying for 
the sultanate between the years 1092–1105 – and also a very long and stable one, 
particularly from Sanjar b. Malikshāh‟s accession to the supreme sultanate in 
1118 until his capture by the Oghuz in 1053.  
An examination of the role of slave soldiers in the Seljuq state during the 
post-Malikshāh period reveals not only that the slave soldiery exhibited the same 
type of self-interest and limited loyalty as did the free soldiery, but that the slave 
system also produced its own additional peculiar and inherent limitations on 
loyalty: first, a heightened degree of rivalry within the slave corps and obsessive 
vying for the ruler‟s favor that led frequently to jealousy and betrayal; and, 
second, the strictly personal nature of the ghulām‟s tie to his master, which 
meant that even the most loyal ghulām‟s allegiance ended with the said master‟s 
demise, after which the ghulām frequently became a threat to his erstwhile lord‟s 
heirs, since his sole remaining loyalties were to his slave-corps faction and his 
own personal interest. 
Current views of slave-soldier loyalty 
Before turning to examine this thesis regarding slave-soldier loyalty in the 
period in question, though, one must first examine the current widely held 
scholarly view of slave-soldier loyalty. It is important to remember in this con-
text that the „Abbāsids did not embrace the military slave system on a large scale 
because they were persuaded of its superiority to all other fighting forces or by a 
belief in the allegedly superior loyalty of such soldiers. Rather, the ʿAbbāsids 
turned to this system because of their difficulty in mobilizing loyal soldiers due 
to the ideological bankruptcy of the caliphate in the early ninth century; in Hugh 
Kennedy‟s description: 
6  SIBṬ IBN AL-JAWZĪ, 1951: 1,161, for instance, describes Malikshāh‟s army in 1072 as having 
consisted of “Turkmens, Arabs, Turks and ghilmān.” 
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[…] The army of the Khurāsāniya and Abnā‟ which had supported the early „Abbasid 
Caliphate was broken and demoralized and its loyalty to the new regime was doubtful […]. 
al-Ma‟mūn and his successor al-Mu„taṣim looked to new groups who, so to speak, brought 
no political baggage with them.7 
In other words, this was a choice born of necessity, rather than of preference: 
Since the „Abbāsids could no longer recruit soldiers through conviction, they 
bought recruits who had no choice in the matter; the prime motivation in turning 
to slave soldiery was simply their alienism and (even more important, but less 
remarked) their lack of any say in the matter of their own recruitment. These 
were soldiers, in other words, who, unlike the free soldiery, did not possess any 
freedom of choice at all regarding whether or not to serve the dynasty; there is 
no indication in the texts that the ʿAbbāsids believed slave soldiers would be 
more loyal to them than would free soldiers.8 
Yet, because the slaves were removed from any prior social context and all 
former ties and loyalties, the assumption of most scholars has been that this 
breaking of former social bonds led to an unconditional loyalty to their new 
master, rather than to the formation of alternative bonds within their new social 
context of the same type that free warriors formed.9 This view is exemplified by 
statements such as the following: “There developed […] a feeling of unbounded 
loyalty between the patron and his Mamlūks”;10 and “Attached to the ruler by a 
personal bond of fealty, [slave troops] could give single-minded loyalty; owing 
everything to their master, they were untrammeled by the material and personal 
interests which locally-raised troops inevitably had.”11  
7  KENNEDY, 2001: 118; see also CRONE, 1980: 61–81. 
8  Obviously, the Seljuq situation was different, since they had an abundant supply of Turk-
mens. One can logically conjecture, although there is no direct supporting evidence other 
than NIẒĀM AL-MULK‟s related statement regarding the benefits of diversity of race (NIẒĀM 
AL-MULK 1334/1955: 107), that there were two motivating factors in their recruitment of 
slave soldiery: a) Slaves provided an auxiliary source of manpower (no ruler of this period 
was averse to augmenting his military forces, even if already well supplied with manpower) 
– one, moreover, especially good for a relatively small palace guard or standing force; 
Niẓām al-Mulk (p. 109) does note that the Turkmens were averse to the settled life required 
of such a force. b) They provided a counterbalance and an alternative to the rather 
headstrong Turkmens, a power balance. 
9  Although AYALON, 1980: 338 notes and acknowledges the primacy of the family ties that a 
mamlūk established upon marriage; this is why he regarded eunuchs as the “ideal type” of 
slave. 
10  AYALON, 1980: 328; this statement would seem to imply that such ties were mutual. 
11  BOSWORTH, 1973: 98–99. 
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However, this view of exceptional mamlūk loyalty is an assumption on the 
part of modern scholars, not the stated or implicit view of the medieval texts or 
the slave-soldiers‟ contemporaries. It is unclear how or upon what grounds this 
modern assumption was formed, other than the retrojection of Ibn Khaldūn‟s 
statements from a later time and a different continent; unless perhaps one 
assumes gratitude for manumission in the cases where such soldiers were freed 
(for the centuries under discussion, we do not know if such slaves were even 
manumitted12), or gratitude for having been converted to the one true religion.13  
It should also be noted here that we know next to nothing about the actual 
training and formation of mamlūk corps throughout the centuries; almost every-
thing that has been conjectured has been based upon the few sentences of Niẓām 
al-Mulk‟s eleventh-century “description” in his mirror for princes of an idealized 
Sāmānid palace ghulām system – sentences which are prescriptive rather than 
historically descriptive.14 Moreover, while the personal element is frequently 
posited as having occupied a key place in this system, it is not clear that a slave 
soldier in training could have forged any kind of personal ties with a ruler who 
possessed hundreds or even thousands of slave-soldiers. It is probably unlikely 
that the ruler had personal contact with any of them, other than perhaps for 
sexual exploitation purposes,15 until after they had spent many years in servitude 
and had risen to an unusually high station. 
12  Although several of the instances adduced infra seem to indicate that in at least some cases 
they were not; there may not have been one rule in such matters, though. It is striking that in 
prominent examples – for instance, when Sultan Sanjar is betrayed by his ghulām ʿAlī 
Chatrī in 1152 during the Ghūrid revolt (this case is discussed below) – gratitude for manu-
mission is never mentioned as among the causes that should have kept the ghulām loyal. 
13  CRONE, 2004: 383. The author is indebted to Patricia Crone for this point and the preceding 
one regarding manumission as possible grounds for gratitude. 
14  NIẒĀM AL-MULK 1378/1958: 141. 
15  On this exploitative aspect of the phenomenon see, for instance, Bundārī‟s rather lurid ac-
count of “the khawāṣṣ of Sanjar and his mamlūks whom he loved then forgot and humbled 
after he had raised them,” which relates that Sanjar was a serial sexual exploiter of mamlūks. 
According to Bundārī, while Sanjar was using them, he would shower them with favors, 
then when he had tired of any particular catamite, Sanjar “thought no more of him and he 
hated him; so he got rid of him and forsook him; and it ended in his loathing him, to the 
point where he would not be satisfied with separation from him after his having been joined 
to him, but he regarded his comfort [as lying] in killing him” (BUNDĀRĪ, 1889: 271). This 
would appear to have been at least as typical of a master-slave relationship as the theoretical 
paradigm of mutual loyalty – and both were probably non-representative of the actual level 
of personal contact and fealty between any given ruler and his hundreds or even thousands 
of mamlūks. 
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While one can perhaps more safely assume that bonds of loyalty did form 
between the slave-soldier and those with whom he was in close and regular 
contact, including his commanders, trainers, and fellow slave-soldiers – the phe-
nomenon that Ayalon identified as khushdāshiyya16 – yet even then, one cannot 
simply presume that such ties were stronger than those prevailing amongst free 
warriors (especially tribal ones). Indeed, more recent scholars of the Mamlūk 
Sultanate itself have considerably discounted and demystified this presumed 
mamlūk loyalty to both the master and the slave-corps cohort.17 
Murder of the master 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, when one examines the evidence, ghulām corps seem 
to be at least as seditious and disloyal as free ones, and arguably more so.18 This 
is, moreover, a characteristic of slave soldiery apparent from the very inception 
of the institution under the „Abbāsids. For the first hundred years or so of 
„Abbāsid rule, before the enrollment of large numbers of slave soldiery in the 
„Abbāsid military, no „Abbāsid caliph was ever murdered by his free soldiers or 
generals; only, on rare occasions, by other family members.19 Within a genera-
16  Ayalon writes of these “comrades in servitude” as having formed part of the “slave family” 
(AYALON, 1980: 327–328). Significantly, this term does not appear in any of the Seljuq 
sources. 
17  E.g. IRWIN, 1986: 237: “It should be noted also that the bond of khushdāshiyya was not 
absolute […]. Though the bond of khushdāshiyya was quite strong, it was not so much an 
emotional bond as a flag of tactical convenience. What khushdāshiyya conveyed was expec-
tations of mutual service and of log rolling. There was, as far as I can tell, no actual in-
doctrination in loyalty to the ustādh […] and to the khushdāsh […]. A mamluk served his 
master because his master served him, and there was money involved.” Similar conclusions 
are reached by LEVANONI, 2004: 114–115. 
18  Note that the sources for this period display no anti-ghulām bias, nor has anyone ever 
claimed that they do. 
19  Most famously, the Caliph al-Hādī; ṬABARĪ, n.d.: 8, 205–207 [DE GOEJE ed. III, 569–571]. 
In fact, disloyalty amongst ghilmān was not limited only to the caliphs; see the appalling 
story about the hard lesson in ghulām disloyalty learned by one of the Arab governing 
officials in Sind in the early „Abbāsid period: First, the ghulām seduced his master‟s wife; 
then, after the master had castrated him in punishment, the ghulām brought his master‟s 
young sons up to the house roof and threatened to cast the boys down unless the master 
immediately castrated himself. After the master mutilated himself on the spot, the ghulām, 
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tion of the massive influx of the slave soldiery into the „Abbāsid armies, in 
contrast, these ghilmān had taken over the state, murdered five successive 
caliphs, and irreparably destroyed „Abbāsid political power. In other words, 
ironically, loyalty suddenly became very much an issue only with the large-scale 
infusion of slave-soldiers into the military.  
The relative unreliability of slave soldiery continued well after the system 
had destroyed the „Abbāsid caliphate from within; examples of slave soldiers 
murdering their masters abound in the sources; indeed, as pointed out in the 
present author‟s previous study concerning the pre-Seljuq period, such betrayals 
were far more common than cases of free soldiery doing the same – even in 
armies in which Mamlūks did not constitute the majority of the soldiery or 
officers.  
Thus, for instance, the Daylamite ruler Mardāvīj b. Ziyār, whose military 
mainstay consisted of his free countrymen,20 was nevertheless murdered by his 
Turkish ghilmān. 21  Similarly, the Sāmānids never experienced murderous 
trouble from the dihqān class or other free warriors; amīrs seem to have been 
murdered only by their slave soldiers, the most notable victim being Aḥmad b. 
Ismāʻīl, slaughtered by his own ghilmān in the year 301/914.22  As for the 
Ghaznavids, at the very time of the Seljuq conquest, Mas„ūd Ghaznavī, pursuant 
to his defeat by the Seljuqs at Dandānqān, was warned that the loyalty of his 
slave troops was unreliable. 23  Shortly thereafter, he was in fact deposed (a 
deposition which led to his subsequent murder) by a conspiracy of his own 
disaffected and disloyal ghilmān, who installed a puppet ruler, Mas„ūd‟s blinded 
brother Muḥammad, thereby following in the footsteps of the „Abbāsid mamlūks 
of the mid-ninth century. 24  It is less commonly known that Mas„ūd‟s son 
Farrukh-zād nearly met the same fate as his father: in the year 450/1058 a group 
________________________________ 
of course, murdered his master‟s small children anyway before their father‟s eyes (MAS„ŪDĪ, 
n.d.: 3, 399).  
20  AL-ṢŪLĪ, 1982: 2, 62; MISKAWAYH, 1921: 1, 161. 
21  AL-ṢŪLĪ, 1982: 2, 62; MISKAWAYH, 1921: 1, 163; IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 8, 298–301. 
22  E.g. IBN FUNDUQ, n.d.: 69; NARSHAKHĪ, 1940: 111; MISKAWAYH, 1921: 1, 33. 
23  BOSWORTH, 1977: 16. 
24  MUSTAWFĪ QAZVĪNĪ, 1943: 398, states merely that “the army rebelled against [him],” but Ibn 
al-Athīr, 1979: 9, 485, states specifically that the traitors were “Anūshtekīn al-Balkhī and a 
group of the palace ghilmān,” as does MĪRKHWĀND, 1920f: 4, 130, who states that the culp-
rits were “Anūshtekīn and ghulāmān-i khavāṣṣ.” GARDĪZĪ, 1944: 439, blames “some ill-
mannered ghulāmān and impudent soldiers,” greedy to steal Mas„ūd‟s treasure. 
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of his own ghilmān plotted to kill him and attacked him in the bath; he managed 
to hold them off until loyal men could rush to his assistance.25 
This pattern of mamlūk disloyalty, unsurprisingly, continues into and 
throughout the Seljuq period as well. In the post-Malikshāh years which con-
stitute our case study, some of the more famous and politically significant 
examples include the murder of the Seljuq claimant Arslān Arghūn b. Alp 
Arslān, brother of Malikshāh, who took over Khurāsān in 1092,26 and whose 
career ended around the beginning of 1097 with his fatal stabbing at the hands of 
one of his own ghilmān27 – despite the fact that, once again, the vast bulk of his 
forces are explicitly described as having consisted of free Turkmen warriors.28  
Another such casualty was the Seljuq ruler of Aleppo, Tāj al-Dawla Alp 
Arslān b. Riḍwān, killed by his father‟s ghilmān in the citadel around the year 
1115. In this case, as with the „Abbāsid caliphs previously, the cause of the 
murder of the ruler was the political ambitions of the ghilmān themselves, who 
wished to install a puppet figurehead whom they could dominate. Thus, after 
they had eliminated Tāj al-Dawla, “they raised his brother, Sulṭān Shāh b. 
Riḍwān, but he was under the control of Lū‟lū‟ the Eunuch.”29 
Other such cases include that of the Būrid ruler of Damascus Shihāb al-Dīn 
Maḥmūd, murdered in his bed in the year 1139 by three of his ghilmān, 
described as having been “amongst his khawāṣṣ and the people closest to him in 
his private and public life, who would sleep by his side every night”;30 the 
similar case of „Imād al-Dīn Zengī b. Aqsunqur, ruler of Mosul and Syria, who 
was also murdered at night, in the year 1146, by a number of his mamlūks (this 
is the word employed both by Ibn al-Athir, one of the first authors to prefer this 
term, and by Ibn al-„Ibrī);31 and the case of the famous author and ʿulamologist 
25  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 5. Note that Ibn al-Athīr employs the terms mamālīk and ghilmān 
interchangeably; his chronicle marks the beginning of the displacement of the latter term by 
the former in the sources. 
26  On whose primary force of nomads see PAUL, 2011. 
27  AL-ḤUSAYNĪ, 1984: 85–86; NĪSHĀPŪRĪ, 2004: 39; RĀVANDĪ, 1945: 143; AL-YAZDĪ, 1979: 2, 
77; BUNDĀRĪ, 1889: 258. In this last account the slave actually explains why he committed 
the deed: “I wished to deliver [all] creatures from his oppression.” 
28  AL-ḤUSAYNĪ, 1984: 85. 
29  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 508. For a fuller exposition of the treachery and ambition of Lū‟lū‟ 
and the ghilmān, see SIBṬ IBN AL-JAWZĪ, 1952: 2, 46–48, 52. 
30  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 9, 68; SIBṬ IBN AL-JAWZĪ, 1952: 2, 171–172. This was by no means 
Maḥmūd‟s first encounter with slave-soldier disloyalty; see also SIBṬ IBN AL-JAWZĪ, ibid.: 
164–165. 
31  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 9, 110; IBN AL-„IBRĪ, 1992: 206. 
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Ibn Mākūla, Abū Naṣr ʿAlī, son of the vizier Abū‟l-Qāsim Hibat Allāh b. ʿAlī 
Ibn Abī Dulaf,32 who in 475/1082f. travelled to Kerman with a group of “his 
Turkish mamālīk, who betrayed him and killed him,” and took what they found 
of his money.33 
Of course, the murders just adduced were the extreme cases. But these 
cases, together with less extreme examples of completely self-interested be-
havior, highlight an important facet of slave-soldier disloyalty: despite all the 
theories, empirically, slave-soldier amīrs seem throughout this period to have 
placed their own welfare and interests above their master‟s with what appears to 
be the same frequency as did non-servile amīrs – and to much deadlier effect. 
Defections, betrayals, and rebellions 
In fact, it appears that most of the rebellions encountered by the various Seljuq 
sultans on the part of non-family members came from military slaves. Thus, to 
take only a few representative truly flagrant and unexplained displays of dis-
loyalty by a ghulām toward his master, in 1131, when Sanjar appointed his 
nephew Toghril to the position of subordinate sultan of Iraq, Masʿūd, Toghril‟s 
brother, rebelled against Sanjar – and was joined in his rebellion by “Qarāja the 
Cup-Bearer, who was Sanjar‟s slave.”34 Then there is the famous example of the 
ingratitude displayed by one of Sanjar‟s closest and most pampered protégés, the 
ghulām „Alī Chatrī, who was both the Sultan‟s major domo and the fief-holder 
of Herat.35 Despite all the benefits which had been conferred upon this ghulām, 
when the lord of Ghūr, Jahān-Sūz, rebelled against Sanjar and invaded Khurasan 
in the year 1152, „Alī Chatrī betrayed his benefactor and threw in his lot with the 
Ghūrid.  
According to the sources, Sanjar was greatly distressed by this betrayal, 
since „Alī “had been the special recipient of [the Sultan‟s] favor; [Sanjar] had 
raised him from the rank of jester to the dignity of major domo.” In fact, so upset 
32  On whom vide DHAHABĪ 1419/1998: 18, 569–579. 
33  IBN AL-JAWZĪ 1412/1992: 16, 226. The author thanks Patricia Crone both for this reference, 
and for knowledge of Ibn Mākūla‟s murder. 
34  MINHĀJ SIRĀJ JŪZJĀNĪ, 1984f : 1, 259–260. According to GHAZNAVĪ, 1967: 37–38, he also 
tried to murder his master by poison. 
35  RĀVANDĪ, 1945: 176; MUSTAWFĪ QAZVĪNĪ, 1943: 450; RASHĪD AL-DĪN, 1943: 2, 336–337; 
SHABĀNKĀRA‟Ī, 1956: 2, 111. 
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was the Sultan by this ingratitude that, after Sanjar had defeated the rebel army, 
he had „Alī Chatrī beaten in two.36 Whatever the reason for „Alī Chatrī‟s treach-
ery – the sources are silent on this point – „Alī obviously did not demonstrate 
greater loyalty than a free soldier would have done, despite the great debt he 
owed to his master.  
Moreover, there were additional problems and limitations, related to loyal-
ty, that were peculiar to slave soldiers. The first of these problems is as follows: 
Either because the slave soldiers‟ primary frame of reference was their own 
tightly-knit corps, or perhaps due to the fact that, being totally dependent, they 
had to compete for the favor of their master and the rewards and privileges that 
were his to bestow, their situation seems to have given rise to great rivalry and 
jealousy among the ghilmān, to an extent that did not occur amongst free 
amīrs.37 In the Seljuq period, ghilmān often became so jealous of one another 
that they ended up betraying their master out of pique, or else bringing disaster 
and defeat upon him in the course of their own obsessive jockeying for position 
with one another. A few examples should suffice to illustrate this characteristic 
phenomenon.  
The first occurred in 1101, when Sanjar b. Malikshāh was governor of 
Khurasan. At this time Sanjar was first absent from Khurasan in Baghdad; then, 
after his return to Khurasan, he fell ill. One of Sanjar‟s important amīrs, a ghu-
lām named Kundughdī or Kundeguz, had entered into treasonous correspond-
dence with Qadir Khān, the Qarakhanid ruler of Transoxiana, and now, after 
Sanjar‟s return, informed Qadir Khān of Sanjar‟s illness and urged him to in-
vade, promising him a quick and easy conquest of Khurasan and Iraq. As a result 
of Kundughdī‟s incitment, the Qarakhanids invaded Khurasan. Sanjar gathered 
his forces and travelled to Balkh, completely unsuspecting of his treacherous 
ghulām. At this point, though, Kundughdī fled to Qadir Khān, then seized con-
trol of the town of Tirmiẓ. According to the sources, this betrayal, which posed 
36  NĪSHĀPŪRĪ, 2004: 60; RĀVANDĪ, 1945: 176; MUSTAWFĪ QAZVĪNĪ, 1943: 450, where his ele-
vation and ungrateful rebellion are described, but not the method of his execution; IBN AL-
ATHĪR, 1979: 9, 164. This is the battle recounted in NIẒĀMĪ „ARUḌĪ SAMARQANDĪ, 1955f: 
104–105, where, however, this ghulām is not mentioned. 
37  This phenomenon of competitive behavior as a consequence of social comparison has been 
well-established by research in social psychology, and researchers have also demonstrated 
that the commensurability and closeness of the comparison counterparts will strengthen and 
sharpen the rivalry (see e.g. GOETHALS and DARLEY, 1977; TESSER, 1988 and 1980; and 
GARCIA / A. TOR / GONZALEZ, 2006 in research that is eminently applicable to top amīrs 
specifically).  
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the most serious threat to Sanjar‟s governorship in its two decades-long duration, 
was motivated entirely by Kundughdī‟s envy of the high standing of his rival, 
the Amīr Buzghush, in the sultan‟s favour.38 
Nor was Sanjar the only later Sultan to suffer from this phenomenon. An-
other such case of betrayal on the part of a Sultan‟s jealous and disgruntled 
ghilmān resulted in the war between the Caliph al-Mustarshid and the Seljuq 
Sultan Mas„ūd in 1135. According to our sources, a number of Mas„ūd‟s leading 
amīrs, most of them ghilmān, headed by Yarunqush the Bāzdār, first rebelled out 
of jealousy over Mas„ūd‟s favouring of the Atabek Qarā-Sunqur; then, after their 
subsequent military defeat by Mas„ūd,39  defected to the „Abbāsid caliph al-
Mustarshid and fomented a war between the latter and their erstwhile master.40 
In this case, at least, disloyalty, while it seems to have been spread amongst both 
slave and free soldiery, was far more prevalent among the former: three of the 
four prominent amīrs named as ringleaders were definitely ghilmān, while the 
fourth, „Abd al-Raḥmān b. Ṭughāyaruk, was a muwallad. According to a number 
of our sources, it was these amīrs who prevailed upon the caliph to go to war 
against their former master Mas„ūd and his overlord Sanjar, to serve their own 
political purposes.41 
In the ensuing battle between caliph and sultan, a further betrayal occurred: 
some of the ghilmān on the caliph‟s side – including the caliph‟s own slaves 
Jāwulī and Bursuq the sharāb sālār, who were commanding the left wing of the 
caliph‟s army – had treacherously come to a secret agreement with Mas„ūd, and 
brought their forces over to his side at the outset of the fighting.42  Further 
compounding the sedition of the day, when the mamlūks commanding the right 
wing “saw that the left wing of the army had committed treachery,” they turned 
and ignominiously fled the field of battle.43  
One can only speculate as to the reason for this piece of treason on the part 
of the mamlūk commanders of al-Mustarshid‟s right wing: Perhaps the caliph‟s 
38  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 347–8; BUNDĀRĪ, 1889: 262; AL-ḤUSAYNĪ, 1984: 90. RĀVANDĪ, 
1945: 169 omits completely this background to the conflict with Qadr Khān.  
39  For this earlier history, see AL-ḤUSAYNĪ, 1984: 107. 
40  BUNDĀRĪ, 1889: 176; ABŪ‟L-FIDĀ‟, 1997: 2, 73; AL-ḤUSAYNĪ, 1984: 107; MĪRKHWĀND, 
1959–1960: 3, 530. See also TOR, 2009: 284–285. 
41  BUNDĀRĪ, 1889: 176; ABŪ‟L-FIDĀ‟, 1997: 2, 73; MĪRKHWĀND, 1959–1960, 3: 530. NIẒĀMĪ 
„ARŪDĪ SAMARQANDĪ, 1955f: 36–37; IBN AL-JAWZĪ, 1992: 17, 291; also recounted in IBN AL-
ATHĪR, 1979: 11, 24–25.  
42  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 11, 25–26.  
43  IBN AL-JAWZĪ, 1992: 17, 295. 
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amīrs were jealous in turn of the caliph‟s favor toward the Mas„ūdi defectors, 
although the only one of our authors to supply an explanation for this behavior, 
Bundārī, attributes it to racial ‘aṣabiyya: “Kind inclined toward kind, the Turks 
inclined toward the Turks, so they betrayed the chaste sanctity of Islam to 
ravishing […].” 44  Whatever the reason, the empirical reality is that neither 
Mas„ūd‟s nor al-Mustarshid‟s ghilmān proved reliable or loyal. As a result, 
Mas„ūd won this particular battle without a single death, and al-Mustarshid was 
first imprisoned and then murdered – the first caliph to be murdered since al-
Muqtadir was eliminated by the ghulām Mu‟nis some two centuries previously.  
Moreover, this kind of betrayal motivated by ghulām jealousy is a recurring 
pattern throughout Seljuq rule. Nor is it an insignificant issue: such betrayals 
motivated by personal rivalry often had disastrous consequences for the polity. 
Two further examples should suffice to prove this point. The first example oc-
curred around the year 1143–44, when Sultan Sanjar mounted a punitive 
expedition against Khwārazm, and besieged the town. One day, in a pre-
coordinated attack, two of Sanjar‟s amīrs breached the walls: a ghulām named 
Sunqur attacked from the East and another, known as Mithqāl al-Tājī, entered 
from the west: “There remained nothing other than to take possession of [the 
city] by conquest and force; but Mithqāl retreated from the city in envy of Sun-
qur […, and] Sunqur remained alone […].” As a result, the operation failed, and 
Sanjar was forced to withdraw.45 
The direst instance of slave-soldier betrayal, though, is surely the encounter 
between Sultan Sanjar‟s army and the Oghuz Turkmen in 1153, an event which 
brought about not only the practical downfall of the Seljuqs but also the de-
struction of Khurasan.46 By this time, relations between Sanjar and the Oghuz 
44  BUNDĀRĪ 1889: 177. As the present author has noted elsewhere, “Although this last action 
strikes one as a topos, it should not therefore be dismissed out of hand: First, because many 
of the motifs which became topoi were not only [as Noth wrote] originally „securely 
anchored to real historical referents,‟ but also continued to be so, because such topoi referred 
either to behaviour which, though reprobated, is extremely common among mankind gen-
erally (i.e. fornication, drinking, or any other sin); or, conversely, to behaviour considered so 
paradigmatic that many people aspiring to holiness actually consciously and deliberately 
emulated the topological action (e.g. use of the takbīr by, for instance, modern Islamist 
airplane hijackers, consciously emulating the pious early Muslims).” TOR, 2011. In other 
words, things often become topoi because they actually are ubiquitous, or at least wide-
spread.  
45  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 11, 95–96. 
46  The eclipse of Khurasan is explicitly attributed in the primary sources to the devastation 
wreaked by the three-and-a-half-year long rampage of the Oghuz, pace recent theories 
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had degenerated to the degree that the sultan mounted an expedition against the 
pastoralists. 47  At this point, no one – least of all the Oghuz themselves – 
dreamed that they stood a chance militarily against Sanjar.48 According to the 
sources, however, the petty rivalries and fractiousness of the corps of ghulām 
commanders then proved decisive. As a result of their perpetual jealousies, most 
of the amīrs deliberately refrained from fighting when combat began – thereby 
losing the battle. This is explicitly stated: 
They manifested resentment among themselves […] and they envied each other; when 
[Sanjar‟s] battle with the Oghuz occurred, the Oghuz had not the ability to fight even one of 
his amīrs; but envy of the Amīr […] Yarunqush brought them to forsake [Sanjar] while he 
was in battle […].49 
Similarly, another source avers: “[The] other amīrs, to spite Yarunqush, were 
remiss in fighting”;50 reputedly, “most” of the high-ranking commanders, who 
supported one of Yarunqush‟s ghulām rivals, did not really fight.51 As a result, 
within minutes, Sanjar‟s trained army was routed by the nomads, and Sanjar 
himself subsequently ended up being taken prisoner, together with his queen.52 
He remained captive – and the Seljuq Empire remained leaderless – for over 
three years, until his escape late in the year 1156, by which time his realm was 
unsalvageable. 
The loyalty evinced by Sanjar‟s military slaves in his hour of need – in-
deed, in his subsequent years of need – is also not particularly impressive. It 
would, in fact, be accurate to say that his mamlūks as a corps evinced complete 
________________________________ 
attributing the sudden eclipse of Khurasan to conjectural climate change (BULLIET, 2009); 
vide e.g. MUSTAWFĪ QAZVĪNĪ, 1942: 452; NĪSHĀPŪRĪ, 2004: 63–68; in greater detail, AL-
YAZDĪ, 1979: 2, 106–113.  
47  On the background to this quarrel, see NĪSHĀPŪRĪ, 2004: 61–62; MUSTAWFĪ QAZVĪNĪ, 1942: 
450–451. 
48  Stated explicitly in the sources, and also revealed in the Oghuz‟s desperate and pathetic 
efforts to propitiate Sanjar and avoid a battle; NĪSHĀPŪRĪ, 2004: 62–63; RĀVANDĪ, 1945: 
178; AL-YAZDĪ, 1979: 2, 102; BUNDĀRĪ, 1889: 282. 
49  AL-ḤUSAYNĪ, 1984: 123; BAYḌĀWĪ, 1934: 78–79. 
50  MUSTAWFĪ QAZVĪNĪ, 1942: 451. 
51  MĪRKHWĀND, 1920: 4, 317; RASHĪD AL-DĪN, 1943: 2, 341: “In battle most of the army was 
deliberately negligent and remiss.” 
52  NĪSHĀPŪRĪ, 2004: 63; MUSTAWFĪ QAZVĪNĪ, 1942: 451. Note that according to some sources, 
his personal retinue, far from remaining loyal in the battle‟s aftermath, “had fled" and left 
their master to his fate. 
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disregard for their master‟s basic welfare, freedom, and kingship. Many of San-
jar‟s ghilmān seem to have regarded his captivity, on the contrary, as a golden 
opportunity to seize power, and immediately busied themselves with carving 
personal fiefdoms out of his dominions. The mamlūks al-Mu‟ayyad Āy-Aba and 
Āy-tākh are egregious examples of this sort: they were strong enough to make 
themselves masters of large swathes of Khurasan, including cities such as Nīshā-
pūr, Ṭūs, Abīward, Dāmaghān and Rayy, expelling the Oghuz from them – yet 
they did not lift a finger to free their captive patron.53  Nor were these two 
prominent mamlūks alone in their disloyalty; it is stated explicitly that “[a]ll the 
amirs of Khurasan and his vizier deserted Sanjar […] not even one of his 
khawāss or his servants [or: eunuchs] remained.”54 Moreover, the postscript to 
this story was that Āy-Aba, after Sanjar‟s death, rebelled against and overthrew 
Sanjar‟s appointed heir.55 We see here, once again, that self-interest rather than 
devotion was the rule with these ghilmān.  
This is, of course, not to assert that every single slave soldier was in-
variably disloyal – that would be as simplistic and unfounded as the idealization 
of ghilmān loyalty against which we are here arguing. Even amongst slave 
soldiery, there were many who must have been loyal to their masters, either out 
of principle or self-interest. Yet even that group posed a severe loyalty problem 
that one does not often encounter in connection with free soldiery, and which 
brings us to the second problem that seems to have been specific to slave sol-
diery: namely, that, as a rule, whatever loyalty a ghulām possessed toward his 
master terminated with the demise of that master, thus posing an enormous 
problem for his master‟s heirs and everyone else around them. 
Ghilmān behavior after the death of their master 
That is, even when the system functioned more or less in accordance with the 
way Ayalon posited that it should, there was an inherent systemic problem: 
loyalty, since it was purely personal, ended in the best of cases with the person 
to whom it was owed. To a large extent, the terrorization of the „Abbāsid caliphs 
on the part of the ghilmān between the years 861 and 870 was the result of this 
intrinsic flaw in the system; while some of them (despite the caliph‟s own doubts 
53  IBN AL-WARDĪ, 1987: 2, 53; IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 11, 183–184; BUNDĀRĪ, 1889: 284. 
54  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 9, 180. On khādim as “eunuch” see AYALON, 1985.  
55  QAZVĪNĪ, 1944: 181; MUSTAWFĪ QAZVĪNĪ, 1942: 453. 
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on this score) may have been loyal to al-Mu„taṣim, the same cannot be said of 
their sentiments and behavior toward his successors.  
There are numerous such examples to be adduced from the later Seljuq 
period. The most extreme cases are of course those in which a ghulām tried to 
murder his master‟s heirs, for instance the attempted murder in 1133 of the 
Būrid ruler of Syria, Ismā„īl b. Būrī, by one of his grandfather‟s ghulāms.56 
More commonly, though, insubordination took the form of a dead master‟s 
ghulāms acting as a completely independent political interest group. These 
freelance corps can be seen variously defecting to a rival overlord or attempting 
to usurp power, either by carving out a fiefdom for themselves, or by using their 
master‟s heir as a puppet or pawn in the furtherance of their own ambitions.  
Such behavior was very much in evidence, for example, after the death of 
Malikshāh, when the existence of numerous candidates (most of them minors) 
for the supreme sultanate provided a golden opportunity for self-aggrandizement 
at the expense of the sultan‟s authority. Thus, after Malikshāh‟s death his ghil-
mān acted essentially as free agents, supporting whomever they wished, switch-
ing their allegiance whenever it suited them, and even taking over whole pro-
vinces for themselves.  
One such instance of usurpation is the case of Qūdun, shiḥna of Marv and 
described as “one of the greatest of [Malikshāh‟s] mamlūks and among the most 
powerful amīrs of his regime [dawla].”57  Qūdun decided in the year 1097, 
together with another mamlūk, Yāruqtāsh, to rebel against Malikshah‟s heir 
Berkyāruq. Together the two killed Sultan Berkyāruq‟s appointee as Khwārazm-
shāh, and simply took over the province; Qūdun and his ally had no qualms 
about fighting the army Berkyāruq sent to bring them to heel.58 Again, this was 
not unusual behavior for ghulāms; whatever loyalty they felt toward their 
masters was, more often than not, not transferrable to his heirs. This is seen time 
and again throughout the period under consideration here: the revolts, double-
crossing, and switching of sides on the part of the mamlūk amīrs during these 
years are ubiquitous; the list of the unfaithful reads like a roster of all the major 
mamlūk commanders: Unar,59 Gawharā‟in,60 Karbūghā,61 Sarmaz,62 and so on. 
56  SIBṬ IBN AL-JAWZĪ , 1951: 2, 147–148; IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 11, 8–9. 
57  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 205. 
58  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 266–267. 
59  SHABĀNKĀRA‟Ī, 1956: 2, 107, where it is specifically stated that “a group of the ghulāmān 
[…] had rebelled; their commander was the Amir Unar”; AL-ḤUSAYNĪ, 1984: 88; RASHĪD 
AL-DĪN, 1943: 2, 307–308; see also his earlier determination to kill Berkyāruq, 304; MUS-
TAWFĪ QAZVĪNĪ, 1943: 441; IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 281.  
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Note that these are people who had been reasonably loyal toward their deceased 
master; but that loyalty was neither transferrable nor heritable. 
Moreover, Malikshah‟s ghilmān were not the only masterless private army 
on the political scene at this time: there was also the large slave-soldier corps of 
his defunct vizier Niẓām al-Mulk, the machinations of which also played a 
critical role in the political chaos of the time. In fact, the civil war essentially 
began because the Niẓāmiyya corps anointed Berkyāruq as rival sultan to Maḥ-
mūd and managed to persuade his Atabeg, the mamlūk Gumushtegin Jāndār, to 
lend his support to this cause.63 According to at least one source, Gumushtegin, 
Yalbard, and other high-ranking amīrs who had until then been Maḥmūd‟s 
supporters defected on the battlefield to the rival army.64  
In fact, the endemic self-interested behavior of all the Seljuq amīrs, as in-
dividuals as well as in corporate groups, is nowhere more blatantly in evidence 
than in the civil wars that tore apart the Empire between the years 1092 and 
1104. The sources even state specifically that in early 1104 the rival sultans, 
Berkyāruq and Muḥammad Tapar, decided upon a divisio imperii between 
themselves after realizing that the only beneficiaries of their continuing warfare 
were their father‟s amīrs, slave and free, who had equally taken advantage of the 
situation to enlarge their own power: “The sultanate had become […] dominated 
[by others], the kings becoming the subjugated, after having been the subduers. 
The great emirs liked this and preferred it, so that they could continue their 
having their own way, and their presumptuousness and boldness.”65 There was, 
empirically, no difference in the conduct and faithfulness of the ghulām and non-
ghulām emirs during these years, and no distinction is drawn between the two in 
the sources. 
Nor was the problem of terminal loyalty by any means limited to the civil 
wars. On the contrary; immediately after the cessation of the civil wars, the un-
disputed Sultan Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, Sanjar‟s uterine brother, was immedi-
ately confronted with the same familiar phenomenon: “In the beginning of his 
sultanate, two ghulāms of his father, one named Sadaqa and the other Ayāz, 
________________________________ 
60  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 289. 
61  IBN AL-WARDĪ, 1969: 2, 11.  
62  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 293. 
63  NĪSHĀPŪRĪ, 2004: 36; SHABĀNKĀRA‟Ī, 1956: 2, 106; AL-ḤUSAYNĪ, 1984: 84–85; BUNDĀRĪ, 
1889: 82–83; RĀVANDĪ, 1945: 140–141; RASHĪD AL-DĪN, 1943: 2, 302. 
64  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 215–216. 
65  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 369. 
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revolted” in the name of one of Berkyāruq‟s sons (that is, Sultan Muḥamad‟s 
nephew, and the son of his erstwhile rival in the civil war).66 This last instance 
highlights one of the more frequent forms worn by the problem of rampant 
ghulāms after their master‟s death, mentioned earlier in passing: It often took the 
guise of seizing a son or other descendant of their deceased master and setting 
him up as a straw sultan. 
Another prime example of this behaviour occurred upon the death of the 
Supreme Sultan Muḥammad b. Malikshāh in 1118. Muhammad‟s brother Sanjar, 
governor of Khurasan, had claimed the supreme sultanate for himself. Simul-
taneously, Sanjar‟s nephew Maḥmūd claimed the Sultanate – or, rather, “The 
amīrs instigated him to [do so].”67 Maḥmūd was in his early teens at the time of 
this conflict, and according to several sources the power controlling him was the 
slave Amīr Mankūbars, prefect of Baghdad, whose vaulting ambition had led 
him to forcibly seize and add to his own harem one of his deceased master‟s 
concubines, the mother of Sultan Mas„ūd, even before the expiration of the 
waiting period mandated by Islamic law. Although the puppet sultan Maḥmūd 
disapproved of this forced marriage and other high-handed acts, “he was not able 
to prevent him.”68 
Sanjar several times articulated, in both word and deed, his certitude that 
his nephew was a mere pawn in the hands of the mamlūk magnates.69 Accord-
ingly, after Sanjar won the resulting military clash, he treated his nephew with 
affection and respect, while, in contrast, he executed several of the most power-
ful mamlūks, whom he held responsible for Maḥmūd‟s bid.70 According to one 
source, however, in Mankūbars‟s case Sanjar decided to let his outraged nephew 
mete out the punishment: “Sanjar handed him over to Sultan Maḥmūd, saying, 
„This is your mamlūk; do with him what you want!‟” Maḥmūd, we are told, “had 
66  SHABĀNKĀRA‟Ī, 1956: 2, 108; MUSTAWFĪ QAZVĪNĪ, 1943: 444, who states that they “had 
been the ghulāms of his father [Malikshāh], then had assisted Berkyāruq against [Muḥam-
mad]; and they wanted that in place of Berkyāruq his son Malikshāh should [rule instead of 
Muḥammad].” Their role in Berkyāruq‟s time is detailed earlier; MUSTAWFĪ QAZVĪNĪ, 1943: 
442. 
67  AL-ḤUSAYNĪ, 1984: 88; RASHĪD AL-DĪN, 1943: 2, 326; SHABĀNKĀRA‟Ī, 1956: 2, 113.  
68  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 557. Note AL-ḤUSAYNĪ, 1984: 106, where it is asserted, on the 
contrary, that “[a]fter the death of Sultan Muḥammad, Sultan Maḥmūd married her to the 
Amīr Mankūbars, whom Sanjar killed.” 
69  AL-ḤUSAYNĪ, 1984: 88; IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 550. For another lurid description of the 
goings-on at this time involving ghilmān, see BUNDĀRĪ, 1889: 123–124. 
70  AL-ḤUSAYNĪ, 1984: 89; IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 552. 
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in himself a fierce rage” toward Mankūbars on account of all his misdeeds, and 
duly killed him.71 
There is a plethora of additional examples one can adduce of military 
slaves whose loyalty, such as it was, ended with the death of their master, and 
then exploited their master‟s child to further their own ends. In 514/1120, Ay 
Aba Juyūsh Beg, atabeg of Sultan Muḥammad b. Malikshāh‟s son Mas„ūd, and 
described as “a Turk, one of the ghilmān of Sultan Muḥammad [b. Malikshāh],” 
decided to have his ward made sultan and therefore abandoned his own sworn 
allegiance to Muḥammad‟s heir, his other son Maḥmūd. After the rebellion was 
defeated, Juyūsh Beg then in turn abandoned his defeated ward, threw himself 
on Maḥmūd‟s mercy, and re-entered Maḥmūd‟s service.72  
It should be noted that attempts by slave soldiers to further their own power 
by putting forward the candidacy of the Seljuq figurehead whose atabeg they 
were, recurred with the death of every subsequent sultan in the areas west of 
Khurasan. Thus, when this same Sultan Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad died in 1131, 
before Sanjar had succeeded in instating his appointee as Maḥmūd‟s successor to 
the subordinate Sultanate of Iraq, Sanjar‟s own ghulām, the cup-bearer Qarāja, 
lord of Fārs and Khūzistān and the atabeg of Prince Seljuqshāh b. Muḥammad, 
marched with a large army to Baghdad and obtained recognition for his can-
didate from the Caliph.73  
71  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 557. The statement seems to provide another important indication 
that at least some Seljuq mamluks, including some of the most prominent ones, were not 
manumitted. This episode also constitutes definitive proof that the slave commander Man-
kūbars is not to be confused with the Seljuq prince Mankūbars b. Būrī Bars b. Alp Arslān, a 
conflation erroneously made by, among others, MUHALLAB, 2000: 318. It should perhaps be 
noted here that under this particular ruler eunuchs, apparently undeservedly, were often 
showered with promotions for which they were unqualified; we are told that Sultan Maḥmūd 
liked to associate with the ladies, “and it was for this reason that his eunuchs (khādimān) 
were promoted to the status of amīrs.” MUSTAWFĪ QAZVĪNĪ, 1943: 454. This was, of course, 
another problem associated with that particular kind of slave. 
72  BUNDĀRĪ, 1889: 132–133; IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 562–565; AL-ḤUSAYNĪ, 1984: 96–97. An 
abbreviated version of these events, and of the mamlūk‟s role, can be found in IBN AL-
WARDĪ, 1969: 2, 25; for an even more cursory mention of this rebellion, see QAZVĪNĪ, 1944: 
182. Another revolt led by the Atabeg Shīrgīr is described in MUSTAWFĪ QAZVĪNĪ, 1943: 
454.  
73  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 674–676. Note that both AL-ḤUSAYNĪ, 1984: 100–101 and BUNDĀ-
RĪ, 1889: 158–159 omit the Seljuqshāh episode, making Qarāja merely a supporter of Ma-
s„ūd – although Sanjar still has Qarāja beheaded. RĀVANDĪ, 1945: 208–209 not only passes 
over the Seljuqshāh rebellion, but does not mention the participation of any of the amīrs.  
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The combined forces of Sanjar‟s nephew Mas„ūd, Qarāja, and Masʿūd‟s 
nephew (and Sanjar‟s great-nephew) Seljuqshāh soon united, in Mas„ūd‟s name, 
against the Supreme Sultan Sanjar in battle. The right wing of the anti-Sanjar 
army was led by Qarāja and another ghulām, Qızıl. However, according to an 
explicit statement in the sources, at this critical juncture there was yet further 
slave-soldier perfidy: Qızıl betrayed his side, having reached a secret agreement 
with Sanjar beforehand to flee.74 As a result, Mas„ūd‟s army was routed and 
Qarāja was taken prisoner. When Qarāja was brought before Sanjar, the sultan 
clearly blamed the slave-soldier for the behavior of his two nephews; he cursed 
him and asked “O evil-doer, what were you hoping for in fighting me?” Qarāja‟s 
reply is quite revealing, and shows very clearly the limitations of mamlūk loyalty 
versus self-interest; Qarāja stated, “I was hoping to kill you and establish a sul-
tan over whom I could rule.”75  
Another conspicuous instance of such non-transferrable loyalty is the 
course of events in the western areas of Sanjar‟s empire in the mid-1140s. In the 
year 540/1145, Būz-Aba, ghulām lord of Fārs and Khūzistān, made common 
cause with Amīr „Abbās, described explicitly as a former ghulām of Sultan 
Maḥmūd‟s,76 and together with a third amīr (the son of a mamlūk), „Abd al-
Raḥmān b. Ṭughāyaruk (whom we encountered earlier in a different case of 
betrayal), renounced their obedience to Sultan Mas„ūd and took over most of his 
territory. 77  They bolstered their standing with the possession of two Seljuq 
puppet princes, the brothers Muḥammad b. Sultan Maḥmūd and Sulaymān Shāh 
b. Sultan Muḥammad. 78  The amīrs unhesitatingly jettisoned both of those 
puppets, however, when Sultan Mas„ūd capitulated to them and, according to an 
explicit statement in the sources, “came under their control [; …] though [they] 
74  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 677. 
75  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 678. A rather fantastic version of this story, referred to briefly 
infra, appears in the hagiography of the Sufi saint Aḥmad-i Jām, the Maqāmāt-i zhandah pīl 
(GHAZNAVĪ, 1967: 35–39), according to which Qarāja the cup-bearer, prior to revolting, 
attempted to poison Sanjar‟s sherbet. While the details of this anecdote are of dubious 
historical accuracy, what is important is the memory of the mamlūk‟s perfidy that has been 
preserved.  
76  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 11, 117. 
77  The instigator and ringleader was clearly Būz-Aba, “who was a Turkish commander, 
amongst the mawālī of the House of Seljuq.” SHABĀNKĀRA‟Ī, 1956: 2, 115. Note that this 
figure, unlike many of the others we have examined, would appear to have been manu-
mitted. 
78  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 11, 104. SHABĀNKĀRA‟Ī, 1956: 2, 115, names Malikshāh as the second 
puppet. 
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were in the service of the sultan, this was in a form that had no meaning behind 
it.” 79 
The following year, Mas„ūd managed to free himself from the cabal of 
amīrs controlling him by employing a loyal Turkmen amīr, Khāss Beg, to 
murder „Abd al-Raḥmān, who had become intimate with the latter. Once „Abd 
al-Raḥmān had been assassinated, Sultan Mas„ūd tricked „Abbās into entering 
his presence alone, and had him killed as well. The following year, 542/1147–8 
Būz-Aba fell in battle against Mas„ūd while attempting to defeat and reassert his 
control over the Sultan; although his army was winning, he himself was taken 
prisoner when his horse fell, and then put to death in front of the Sultan.80 
This particular episode, like the penultimate one we examined, is illuminat-
ing because it epitomizes the inherent limitations and dangers of the slave 
system: disloyal amīrs, mainly ghilmān – two of the triumvirate in Mas„ūd‟s 
case are ghilmān – and especially the ghilmān left over from a former reign, 
attempt to turn the de jure ruler into a cipher, under their complete sway. 
Mas„ūd, however, was more fortunate than his „Abbāsid and Sāmānid pre-
decessors who found themselves in similar situations; Mas„ūd also had Turkmen 
amīrs, who remained loyal, and one of whom was able to thwart the de facto 
coup.  
Other Seljuq rulers, of course, did not fare so well in similar situations: 
After the death of Mas„ūd, due also partly to Sanjar‟s captivity and therefore the 
loss of any force strong enough to counterbalance the growing power of the 
defunct Mas„ūd‟s slave corps, the Seljuq sultans in Iraq and western Iran 
succumbed to the same malady that had previously overcome the „Abbāsids, the 
Samanids, and the late Buyids – dynasties in which the slave corps had become 
preponderant: “The government of the Seljuqs […] continued in Iraq in a 
manner that was meaningless, for the Atabegs ruled over [the Sultans] until the 
death of Sultan Tughril [i.e. the complete end of Seljuq rule] in […] 1194.”81 
Indeed, the parallels with the mamlūk takeover of the earlier dynasties are 
striking: For example, after the death of Muḥammad II b. Maḥmūd II, Sultan of 
Iraq, in 1159, we are told that “a council of the royal amīrs” chose his successor, 
Sulaymānshāh (deliberately picking the most feckless and pleasure-loving, and 
79  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 11, 104. 
80  This is the story given in IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 11, 119. It is instructive to compare this 
account with SHABĀNKĀRA‟Ī, 1956: 2, 115–116, whose narration seems intended to bolster 
Mas„ūd‟s authority. A confused version of all these events can be found in MUSTAWFĪ 
QAZVĪNĪ, 1943: 456–457.  
81  AL-ḤUSAYNĪ, 1984: 195.  
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therefore the most controllable, candidate) – and shortly thereafter deposed and 
imprisoned him.82  
There is one third and final limitation related to slave soldier loyalty that 
should be noted before concluding: that of their competing corporate identity. It 
was mentioned in the beginning of this article that slave-soldiers seemed at least 
as likely to develop a primary bond of loyalty toward their cohort as they did 
toward their master. We therefore see, time and again, after the master of a corps 
of slave soldiers has died, his body of mamlūks continuing to act together as a 
kind of ersatz tribe.  
Thus, for example, the Nizāmiyya mamlūks continued to function as a 
distinct entity after Nizām al-Mulk‟s death, acting in their own collective inter-
ests, and became a political force to be reckoned with, “to the point where the 
ghulāmān of Niẓām al-Mulk were the most powerful [people] in the polity.”83 In 
fact, after the defection of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh‟s army, which was dis-
cussed earlier, what saved him was not only his brother Sanjar and the Khura-
sanian army, but also the Nizāmiyya mamlūk corps, which had basically been 
ruling Rayy, and now decided to throw in their lot with this camp.84  Such 
corporate entities were, after their masters were removed, every bit as danger-
ous, unpredictable, and self-interested as were the Turkmen bands. 
Conclusion 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the evidence we have examined. First, in 
contrast to the modern scholars examining the mamlūk phenomenon, medieval 
Muslims do not seem to have held greater expectations of loyalty from slave 
soldiers than from free soldiers and servitors; the sources from this period do not 
articulate such an expectation. For instance, as we saw above, Sanjar‟s rebuke of 
ʿAlī Chatrī after the latter‟s defection to the Ghūrid rebellion mentions nothing 
about ʿAlī‟s servile status, about manumission, or about special ties between a 
master and his mamlūk: what outrages Sanjar about ʿAlī‟s treason is ʿAlī‟s 
82  SHABĀNKĀRA‟Ī, 1956: 2, 118–119. 
83  “Tā ghulāmān-i Niẓām al-Mulk buzurgān-i dawlat būdand,” MUHALLAB, 2000: 315; in other 
words, after the death of Malikshāh and during Berkyāruq‟s time their corporate body 
constituted the major political player. See, for example, their critical role as described in 
MUSTAWFĪ QAZVĪNĪ, 1943: 440. 
84  IBN AL-ATHĪR, 1979: 10, 305–306. 
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ingratitude for the tangible benefits and promotions Sanjar had conferred on him 
– benefits that were of the type conferred by rulers upon all their servitors and 
liegemen, irrespective of personal status.  
In other words, medieval Muslims considered slave-soldier loyalty as 
falling within the category of gratitude for tangible benefits conferred (shukr al-
niʿma), the same principle governing all those relationships Mottahedeh has 
termed “acquired loyalties”; that is, socially constructed or elective loyalties, 
formed by patronage, rather than natural or existential (i.e. biological, regional, 
religious, or tribal) ties.85 It should not surprise us, then, that mamlūks frequently 
failed, as did free soldiery, to honor the obligations of loyalty. 
Much also has been made in this context of the supposedly anomalous ser-
vile personal status of slave-soldiers, and it has been assumed that this status and 
original dislocation produced a different kind of warrior than did, say, the 
system of knighthood and fealty in England and France during the same period 
(the eleventh and twelfth centuries); but Orientalists have overlooked the fact 
that the preponderance of German knighthood at this time was also composed of 
unfree knights, the ministeriales, who constituted an elaborate elite-service slave 
system notably similar to that of the ghilmān.86 And the ministeriales, like the 
ghilmān, often honored their bonds of loyalty in the breach: 
As a social order, the German ministeriales were imbued with the values of knightly vas-
salage, but it was also true that the norms of loyalty and service often gave way to disorderly 
and self-interested abuses. They usurped offices, lands, and revenues, they pursued destruct-
tive feuds which could degenerate into extensive banditry over many years, and they might 
even engineer conspiracies ending in the expulsion or murder of their lords.87 
This is not to say that slave soldiers did not possess significant attractions. For 
one thing, they were readily available, in any numbers that one wished. Better 
yet, one did not have to recruit them or win them over; they were slaves and 
therefore had no choice in the matter. It is also true that, in their new setting, 
they had no prior claims on their allegiance; whatever other motives or loyalties 
85  MOTTAHEDEH, 1980: 72–82. While Mottahedeh asserts (p. 86) that “In most cases, people 
expected the ghulām to have his strongest loyalty to his original patron”, he adduces no 
primary source evidence to support this claim. It is telling that we find no medieval Muslims 
before Ibn Khaldūn articulating such an expectation – and Mottahedeh acknowledges as 
much when he states, correctly (p. 84), that the expectations of loyalty from ghilmān appear 
to have been couched in general terms of patronage (iṣṭināʿ) rather than clientage (walāʾ). 
86 ARNOLD, 1985: passim, but especially 23–75; BOSL, 1978; FREED, 1986. 
87  ARNOLD, 1985: 225. 
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they subsequently developed, at least they did not start out, as did Turkmens, 
with their primary loyalty defined by tribal identity and family. And slaves were 
– at least until a given slave‟s social position became well established – more 
beholden toward their lords than were freeborn men, especially ones of high 
estate. These notable advantages clearly made slave-soldiery attractive to both 
Islamic and German eleventh- and twelfth-century society. The problem lay in 
the fact that the slaves did not remain dislocated blank slates for very long. 
The evidence suggests that, at least in regard to the question of loyalty, the 
end products of the two systems, servile and free, were not terribly different: 
Both produced bands of cavalry warriors bound by ties of fealty and patronage 
to a lord, but still subject to all the normal human temptations and calculations of 
self-interest, as well as competing loyalties arising from their warrior sodality, 
loyalty to their more immediate commanders, and personal interests. Probably 
much of the time they could be relied upon to demonstrate more or less the same 
sort of loyalty as did other, non-servile warriors and servants. Indeed, the 
parallels between the mamlūk palace corps in particular and the non-servile 
household retainer system in, for example, England is striking.88 At least on the 
score of loyalty, the evidence suggests that having entered a lord‟s service as his 
slave was no guarantee of a man‟s fidelity, any more than the oath of fealty was 
in the West; the Seljuqs‟ amirs, both slave and free, appear to have given much 
the same sort of trouble to their respective lords as Western barons did to 
theirs.89 Nor should this fact surprise us: Servants and slaves may be easier to 
88  Note that the Old English “cniht” (“knight”) originally, as with the term ghulām, meant 
merely “boy” or “attendant”, and then developed its secondary meaning of “retainer”; and 
could, as with the term ghulām, be used interchangeably in any of these senses: it “some-
times betokens a young knight or retainer, and sometimes a household servant.” CROUCH, 
2011: 7. The twelfth-century lament of a bereaved household upon the death of its lord 
translated by Crouch (p. 31) mirrors the sense of benefits conferred that Sanjar voices: “You 
gave us our equipment, our rewards and great estates; you retained your large military 
household and kept it cheerful and active, giving us our necessities […]. You gave us sleek 
horses, gold, silver, and rich silks […]. You loved your knights and took good care of them. 
Those who served you had no cause to regret it, for they never lacked anything […]. But 
you are lost and gone, fair lord, and have left us grieved and outraged.” 
89  See e.g. BISSON, 2009: 259–269 on the murder of Charles the Good of Flanders by his own 
lordly vassals; GREEN, 2006: 60–77, 231–235 and MORTIMER, 1994: 86–104 on major 
baronial rebellions in England; note also GREEN, 1997: 221: “Military power has too often 
been described in terms of obligations owed to kings in the form of quotas of knight service, 
whereas in reality the political history of the Anglo-Norman period was characterized by 
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dominate and control than free men, but only until they have been given so much 
power that their servile status becomes purely nominal.90  
The second conclusion one arrives at is that the sources do occasionally 
reveal a peculiar emotional bond between ghilmān and their masters, but pri-
marily as a contributing factor, ironically, to disloyalty. Whereas both slave and 
free warriors were perfectly willing to die in battle for love of their lord, it is the 
ghilmān who, in their competitive jealousy, behave very much like co-wives, 
piqued rivals jockeying for their master‟s affections, ready to sit out battles and 
pout if a rival was perceived as being more favored.91 This emotional atmo-
sphere is indeed quite different, not only from that found in medieval Europe, 
but also from that found among free Muslim warriors. 
This difference in the quality of the emotional tie between man and master 
among slaves on the one hand and free men on the other finds clear expression 
in literature: Whereas the ideal of service and love for one‟s lord as it relates to 
medieval Islamic free warriors is found in courtly romances such as Samak-e 
ʿAyyār or the Iskandar-nāmah, and the comparable European ideal in chansons 
de geste such as the Song of Roland, the literary expression of the relationship 
between Islamic master and ghulām is celebrated in love poetry, particularly 
erotic poetry featuring the young ghulām cup-bearer or sāqī.92  
Finally, our examination of the rather mixed record of slave-soldier loyalty 
highlights the intractability of one of the most vexatious and serious problems 
confronting medieval rulers and noblemen, whether in Christendom or the 
Islamic world: to wit, how to ensure the loyalty of their commanders, magnates, 
and retainers. It does not appear that any of the methods devised to this end – 
whether oaths of fealty, the use of slaves or the baseborn, or the lavish bestowal 
of gifts and benefits – were entirely successful. 
________________________________ 
frequent rebellions where the military muscle of the aristocracy was turned against the 
king.”  
90  The author is indebted to Patricia Crone for this last point, and for noting the parallel be-
tween the harem-master and mamlūk-master relationships. 
91  And let us not forget that it was a bout of such behavior, in the battle against the Oghuz in 
1153, which destroyed the Seljuq Empire. 
92  Note that many of the great amīrs actually began their careers as sāqī or cup-bearer, most 
notably Maḥmūd of Ghazna‟s catamite and prominent amīr Ayāz; on this theme see 
YARSHATER, 1960: especially 49–52. 
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